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I  Introduction 
 
This paper explores the potential impact of BREXIT on the Scottish financial 
services sector.  For the purpose of this discussion the assumption is that 
Scotland remains part of the UK.   
 
At present there is clarity neither as to what BREXIT will mean for the UK nor 
how this will play out for the UK financial sector.  There is also a good deal of 
XQFHUWDLQW\UHJDUGLQJ6FRWODQG¶VIXWXUHFRQVWLWXWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVZLWKUHJDUG
to relationships both with the UK and with the EU.  Given the extent of these 
uncertainties, we decided to omit reference to the possibility of a second 
independence referendum and what that might mean for the sector.  That could 
be another topic for another day.   
 
The paper is structured as follows.  First we summarise the key issues related 
to the financial sector for the UK as a whole.  Next we turn to the Scottish sector, 
first providing an overview of the sector and then considering the critical issues 
so far as each major component of the Scottish sector is concerned.  Finally we 
summarise our conclusions.  We note SRVVLEOH¶JOLPPHUVRIKRSH¶Ior the sector, 
related to:  
 
1. $SRVVLEOHµVRIW¶%5(;,7 
2. A special deal for UK financial services on skilled non-UK labour or, 
failing that 
3. An analogous special deal for Scotland 
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II  The Impact on the UK Financial Services Sector 
 
A great deal has already been written and said about the possible impact of 
BREXIT on the UK financial services sector, but it is clear that most of this is, 
inevitably, conjecture.  We do not know what BREXIT will mean, nor when it will 
actually come to pass and whether there might be special arrangements for the 
financial services sector and/or an extended transition period. 
 
At the time of writing, the UK government has not set out its priorities in full; nor 
have formal negotiations started.  Senior figures in the industry have been 
meeting Ministers and representative bodies have been making proposals, but 
the vacuum of knowledge on which proposals can be based has led to only very 
generalised commentary and discussion.  The implication of statements from 
the Prime Minister and key BREXIT Ministers  is that priority will be given to 
limiting freedom of movement and hence immigration, rather than continuing 
access to the single market.  Ministers would appear to be willing to sacrifice 
the latter for the former.  How flexible this view might be will only be seen as 
discussions continue. 
 
It is reasonable to characterise the mainstream view from within the UK financial 
industry as favouring a clear and stable relationship between the UK and EU, 
and one which retains as many features of the current relationship as possible, 
since that implies as little disruption as possible and maintains open markets 
within the EU as it is currently configured.  In sum the sector would prefer a 'soft' 
BREXIT.  
 
There are, however, supporters of a more radical break with established 
practices and a move towards putting the UK/EU relationship on a footing more 
similar to that of non-European countries.  This view is justified principally on 
the grounds that it will free the UK financial industry from what is perceived as 
heavy-handed EU regulation.  This minority view favours a 'hard' BREXIT.  
Holders of this view appear to accept that an outcome in which the UK is not 
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part of EU single-market frameworks, like the passporting regime discussed 
below, is justified as such participation would entail subjection to an 
unacceptable degree of EU oversight and regulation.1  Holders of this view 
might also see access to passporting via EEA/EFTA membership as 
unacceptable; as this would not only involve being subject to that 
oversight/regulation (and probably some payment to the EU) but also having no 
say in how that regime would change over time. 
 
What Matters Most? 
 
The key factors for the UK financial services industry appear to be the issue of 
µpassporting¶Dnd access to non-British staff.  Passporting is the arrangement 
whereby British companies in the sector are permitted to trade across the whole 
of the single market and also foreign firms can achieve that right by establishing 
passporting via links with UK companies.  It has been estimated2 that 5,500 
ILQDQFLDOVHUYLFHFRPSDQLHV¶SDVVSRUWWKHLUVHUYLFHVRXWRIWKH8.DQGLQWRWKH
EU; while some 8,000 passport services into the UK from the EU. 
 
Passporting is enshrined for members of the EU.  It is also feasible, with some 
caveats, for members of the EEA and other countries making special deals with 
the EU.  But these alternative forms of access come at a cost.  First there is an 
actual financial cost ± a payment to the EU is required.  6HFRQGWKHµDVVRFLDWH¶ 
passport members have no influence whatever over the rules and regulations.  
$Q\FKDQJHVKDYHWREHDFFHSWHGRQDµWDNHLWRUOHDYHLW¶EDVLV 
The implication of recent statements by the Prime Minister and her BREXIT 
Ministerial team is that they are not minded for the UK to make any payments 
to or trade-offs with the EU to retain access to the single market.  It could be 
assumed that this would also apply to passporting.  That could have major 
implications for the sector across the UK. 
 
                                                     
1
 https://www.ft.com/content/cd29621b-b2ff-3151-9941-e7bacfa3f870#myft:list:page 
"Shore Capital hopeful of EU regulation roll back" 
2
 Financial Times 25th September 2015. 
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The position on non-UK personnel is also uncertain, and becoming increasingly 
confused.  At present there are very large numbers of highly skilled (and highly 
paid) foreign staff in UK financial sector companies, and in foreign companies 
based here.  These people come from elsewhere in the EU and more widely.  
We do not know if those already here would all be permitted to stay, and if so 
on what basis.  Nor do we know whether further foreign staff could be recruited 
post BREXIT and again what conditions might apply.  Already there are some 
anecdotal stories of this causing problems over recruitment and retention. 
 
A key issue for many domestic and foreign financial sector companies in the UK 
will be the question of access to skilled staff.  These skills are utterly critical to 
companies in many elements of the sector, especially the high value-added 
elements.  Their presence in the UK adds substantially and directly to GDP and 
exports; and is also a key basis for attracting other elements of the sector and 
other business and professional service organisations.  The employees of these 
companies are very (to some incredibly) highly paid; and that means that they 
pay very large sums in income tax to the UK exchequer.  Losing such high skill 
components of the sector would mean major direct and indirect impacts on the 
HFRQRP\DQGDOVROHDYHDODUJHKROHLQWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VILQDQFHV 
 
For which components does BREXIT matter most? 
 
The EU single market is, on the face of it, more important to the UK investment 
banking industry than to its retail and commercial counterparts3.  This is not 
surprising, since retail banking and much of commercial banking is jurisdiction-
limited, for the most part.  In other words, services are not sold across EU 
internal borders.  It is estimated, nonetheless, that between a fifth and a quarter 
of London's investment banking business is dependent on access to the EU 
market (ibid.). 
                                                     
3
 &LW\¶VVSHFLDOUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK(8ILQDQFHV\VWHPUHYHDOHG 
Banks that use UK as gateway to Europe make profits of £50bn and have more than £7.5tn of 
assets (Financial Times, 25 September, 2016 
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However, retail banking may not be immune from impact.  It is reported 4 that 
consumer banking, in several respects, could be detrimentally affected by 
BREXIT: some 70% of credit cards are provided from the UK to the EU and 
acceptance of UK credit cards in other EU countries, at the transaction level, 
could become limited.  It is estimated that some £20bn of services a year are 
exported by UK banks to the EU and that some wealth management services 
will simply become un-exportable (ibid.).  
 
For all financial services providers, the issue of 'passporting' is central and this 
has been the focus of most industry commentary and analysis.  It affects all 
sectors, but particularly insurance, banking and asset management5.  Not all 
companies will be affected ± much depends on the nature of their particular 
businesses and not all businesses rely on 'passporting'.  But a lot of insurance 
business is based in London because of the ability to passport services from 
there to the rest of the EU. 
 
As discussed above, under a 'hard' BREXIT, passporting between the UK and 
the EU is likely to come to an end.  Providers will need then to consider whether 
they should set up new operations in other EU countries, in order to retain 
passporting rights, or find some other way of maintaining their customer 
relationships. 
Under a 'softer' version of BREXIT, passporting rights could be maintained.  But, 
at the time of writing, this looks unlikely. 
 
This is not a binary choice, of course, and in such a complex negotiation there 
may be special dispensations and exemptions.  But speculating on their nature 
and likelihood is not possible until some principles are established and this has 
yet to occur.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer, for example, has floated the 
                                                     
4
 'Confidential report reveals Brexit threat to retail banking", Financial Times, 26 September, 
2016 
5
'Brexit: assessing the impact on asset managers' - Clifford Chance Briefing Note, April 2016 
https://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2016/07/brexit_assessingtheimpactonassetmanager
s.html 
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possibility that some people working in financial services could be given special 
treatment within what is expected to be a tighter immigration control policy6.  As 
noted above that would be most welcome to components of the sector and 
might be necessary in order to retain key and high value-added and high 
skill/high pay sub-sectors in the UK. 
 
The possibility that passporting rights could be maintained on the basis of 
'equivalence' has been mooted, where a jurisdiction demonstrates that it 
operates the same standards of regulation and, on that basis, is permitted to 
exercise passporting rights.  The drawbacks of this, which are not trivial, are 
that (as with EEA membership) the need to comply is not associated with any 
right of influence over the rules, so it is a 'take it or leave it' offer; that 
equivalence status can be revoked; and that it is not available for insurance7 
and mutual funds. 
 
It is not possible to say what BREXIT will mean for the City of London's main 
financial markets.  Commentators have homed in on the possibility that the EU 
will require euro-denominated derivative transactions to be managed on 
exchanges based, geographically, in the EU, as that requirement has been 
mooted before.  On the other hand, it is suggested that cash foreign exchange 
trading relies on liquidity, where London is dominant, and does not depend on 
clearance-based risk management, but is settled in the London-based CLS 
bank.  So the precise impacts of BREXIT on these various clearing houses and 
exchanges are not knowable at this stage. 
 
It is uncontentious to observe that the UK financial services industry is a big part 
of the UK economy and a significant asset for the EU.  So there will be room for 
give and take in any negotiation.  But the positive case for BREXIT, for financial 
                                                     
6
 'Hammond vows to protect top bankers from EU migration curbs', Financial Times, 8 
September 2016 
7
 /RQGRQ¶Vinsurers rush to cover the Brexit bases: ,QGXVWU\LVZDU\RIORVLQJµSDVVSRUWLQJ¶
rights but confident it will adapt, Financial Times, 29 September 2016 
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services, rests on the proposition that access to other markets, like India and 
the US, will be improved, even though such access is within the gift of the 
authorities in the market concerned.  If that aspiration is realised, then it might 
generate profits for UK-domiciled companies, but it won't create significant 
numbers of jobs in the UK, since the actual delivery of the services will take 
place locally.  
 
The other aspect of the pro-BREXIT argument is that the UK can change its 
regulatory framework in such a way as to make it more attractive to foreign 
companies than competing jurisdictions.  Again, if this can be achieved, it may 
attract assets and transactions, but not necessarily large numbers of jobs.  
Further, looser regulation could imply attracting higher risk activities ± and post-
2008 we should be wary. 
 
III  6FRWODQG¶VILQDQFLDOVHUYLFHVLQGXVWU\± in brief 
6FRWODQG¶V ILQDQFLDO VHUYices industry is one of the nation's most important 
business sectors, as a component of GDP, a generator of wealth, a very 
substantial employer and a competitive player in international markets.  It is a 
diverse industry that includes savings, loans, insurance, pensions, investment 
management, and asset servicing and professional services.  
 
The financial services industry in Scotland contributes around £8 billion a year 
to the Scottish economy and employs around 90,000 people directly and a 
further 90,000 indirectly.  Taken as a whole, this is roughly a twelfth of the total 
Scottish workforce.  The principal centres of employment are Edinburgh and 
Glasgow and there are also significant operations in Aberdeen, Dundee, Perth 
and Stirling.  
 
The industry has developed over centuries and has a strong international 
reputation.  There are risks associated with BREXIT but, historically, they are 
not the largest that the industry has faced.  While it is not easy to see new 
opportunities arising from BREXIT, equally the threats are not, given the 
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diversity of the sector, existential.  Perhaps the biggest threat is the risk it 
creates for the UK economy as a whole, since a thriving UK economy drives 
demand for UK financial services. 
 
For the purposes of assessing the likely effects of BREXIT, there are three ways 
of categorising the activities and operations that make up the financial services 
industry in Scotland:   
 
x by sector, since different kinds of financial services will be affected 
differently;  
x by location and ownership, for regulatory purposes, since regulation is a 
central factor in company structuring and decision-making; and 
x by market, since protecting and expanding market share is a main driver 
for a lot of company activity. 
 
These three categories overlap, however.  RBS, for example, is a bank with 
most of its customers in the UK, so it is perhaps less concerned than some 
others about the delivery of services directly to other parts of the EU.  It is 
registered in Scotland for regulatory purposes, so it is regulated by the UK 
authorities and is perhaps less concerned about how it might be regulated in 
other parts of the EU than, say, a bank with subsidiaries in several other 
countries.  And, as noted above, its principal market is the UK.  
 
Some Scottish fund management companies, in contrast, serve clients all over 
the world and, in some cases their UK customer base is small or even non-
existent.  Because they are providing services to investors in other parts of the 
EU, they may be concerned about how those relationships will be affected by 
the UK ceasing to be part of the EU's common regulatory framework.  And they 
may be concerned about their market share in other countries, if BREXIT 
changes the basis on which that market is served, either because of regulatory 
complications or because they are treated differently in some other way 
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because their home country, the UK, is no longer in the EU.  The UK will 
become, in EU policy language, a 'third country'. 
 
By sub sector 
 
The banks operating in Scotland are predominantly domestic providers of 
financial services.  Banking services are not, by and large, exported to the EU 
from Scotland.  The single EU market for commercial and retail banking 
services is not well-developed, partly because compensation schemes are 
operated at member state level and it is rare for a customer, either as a business 
or an individual, to hold a bank account in another country.  Capital markets and 
corporate banking are international, however, though these tend to be managed 
out of London. 
 
Asset managers in Scotland provide services to clients around the world, 
including in the EU.  The EU single market for investment vehicles, like funds 
and trusts, has broadened and deepened in recent years, so that an investment 
fund managed in Scotland can attract investors from all over the EU.  Fund 
providers, if they set up the fund within the EU and who meet certain standards, 
are exempt from national regulation in individual EU countries.  Their products 
are 'passported' into other national jurisdictions without the need for country-by-
country approvals.  Providers in countries outside the EU, like the UK post-
BREXIT, either have to establish their funds within an EU member state, and 
'passport' throughout the EU from there or market their funds from the UK under 
a more complex procedure.8  Some or all of this could become necessary, 
depending on the outcome of negotiations.  The risks to this sub-sector are clear 
and of substance.9wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww 
 
                                                     
8
 "Investment Association warns about Brexit impact on UK funds", Financial Times, 29 
September 2016 
 
9 6HHµ7KH,PSDFWRIWKH8.¶V([LWIURPWKH(8RQWKH8.-%DVHG)LQDQFLDO6HUYLFHV6HFWRU¶E\
Oliver Wyman; 2016. 
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Asset servicing, which is the administration and execution of investment 
transactions and the protection and custody of financial assets, is dominated by 
large, international banks, although there are also some smaller, boutique 
providers, principally serving wealth managers.  Several of them have 
operations in Scotland and the sector has grown considerably in recent years, 
creating sizeable numbers of high quality, internationally-focused jobs.  Within 
the UK, Scotland is the leading centre for asset servicing.  The clients of these 
operations are other financial institutions.  They serve clients around the world 
and comply with regulatory requirements on behalf of those clients, wherever 
they are.  These companies may see a disadvantage with dealing with 
companies in Scotland if and when the Scottish companies no longer have 
passporting rights.  Also limited access to high skill staff could constrain both 
asset management and asset servicing. 
 
This pen picture of asset servicing might imply that these operations are all the 
same but there are several varieties.  Some serve UK customers, in the main, 
but most have clients in many countries.  Some are providing services that are 
not dependent on regulatory jurisdiction and could, in a sense, be located 
anywhere.  Others operate to a large degree under the EU's regulatory 
framework for investments, outlined above, and if the UK withdraws from that, 
questions may arise in a small number of cases about whether work carried out 
in Scotland will have to move to an EU location.  For the most part, these 
operations are highly mobile and, indeed, dispersion of risk is a key factor in 
most location decisions.  Other key factors are cost and availability of talent.  If 
the UK does make it much more difficult to bring in skilled people from other 
FRXQWULHVLWZLOOXQGHUPLQHRQHRIWKH8.DQG6FRWODQG¶VPDLQDWWUDFWLRQVIRU
internationally mobile businesses and activities. 
 
The insurance sector can be divided into life insurance, which is closely linked 
to pensions; and general insurance, which is the provision of the risk-
management services that underpin almost all economic activity, from building 
bridges to driving a car.  As with banking, there is an international market for 
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insurance, and it is based in London.  So the extent of activities in Scotland 
focused on international insurance, or providing insurance services to the rest 
of the EU, is limited. 
 
Pension providers (linked to life insurance, in many cases) are large companies, 
since liabilities are very long-term and scale is necessary.  There is not much 
of a single EU market in pensions, as a pension depends for its structure on the 
tax framework within which it sits, and taxation is largely a member state 
responsibility, so it is difficult to sell the same pension in more than one place.  
The pensions industry in Scotland is generally serving the UK market. 
 
Wealth management, as a sector, overlaps to some degree with asset 
management.  But there is a thriving and growing sector in Scotland that 
provides advice and investment services to private clients.  Some are parts of 
larger financial services companies that provide services in other EU countries 
but the services are regulated at member state level so direct provision across 
borders is unusual. 
 
Providers of professional services in Scotland, principally accountants, lawyers 
and actuaries, serve clients in many jurisdictions.  In general, the single EU 
market for business services is not well developed, so provision across borders 
is not always easy.  The big professional services companies have a network 
of offices to facilitate operations that comply with local legal and regulatory 
requirements.  The size of the sector in Scotland depends, however, on the 
scale and success of the financial services industry as a whole, since it provides 
the local client base and an ecosystem of skills and professional bodies. 
 
By location and ownership 
 
There are various ownership and governance models operating in Scotland's 
financial services industry.  To summarise for the larger operations, and 
eschewing an exhaustive taxonomy: 
University of Strathclyde | International Public Policy Institute                                                                         Policy Brief 
 
October 2016                                                                                                                            12 
x Some public companies (that is, listed on the stock market) are 
headquartered in Scotland, are not part of some larger entity, and have 
Scotland as their place of registration for regulatory purposes.  The list 
of such companies is not long and it includes Standard Life, RBS, 
Aberdeen Asset Management and Alliance Trust.  
 
x /OR\GV %DQNLQJ *URXS¶V UHJLVWHUHG RIILFH LV LQ (GLQEXUJK EXW WKH
headquarters is in London.  Baillie Gifford, unusually but not uniquely, is 
a partnership, registered and headquartered in Scotland.  
 
x Most other operations in Scotland are part of larger corporate entities, 
either UK-EDVHG OLNH $YLYD 5R\DO /RQGRQ DQG 6DLQVEXU\¶V %DQN RU
foreign, like Citi, J P Morgan and Santander.  
 
By market 
 
Nearly every provider of financial services in Scotland, to a greater or lesser 
extent, serves the UK market.  A company with most of its customers in the UK 
will not be insulated from BREXIT but the questions that arise for, say, some 
fund managers, around direct access to an EU-wide customer base, will not 
arise.  Of course some of the customers elsewhere in the UK may face adverse 
impacts as a result of BREXIT and this could lead to indirect adverse effects on 
the Scottish companies related to UK exit from the EU. 
For any given company, a combination of the following factors will need to be 
considered in assessing the implications of BREXIT:  
 
x The nature of the business and how its conduct, financial management 
and marketing will be affected by changes to legal and regulatory 
frameworks, including trade agreements. 
x The ownership and regulatory standing of the business ± is it regulated 
in more than one jurisdiction and how will the relationships between 
different parts of the business be affected?  
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x The markets and customers either served currently or in which growth or 
new business is being sought. 
 
All financial institutions in Scotland depend, however, on London's markets and 
market infrastructure to support their activities, whether that is raising money on 
the capital markets, participating in Lloyds insurance market or the buying and 
selling of bonds.  If some of that business moves away from the UK, as some 
predict, then the cost and complexity for all UK companies could rise.  If, on the 
other hand, these markets remain stable, it may only be the period of 
uncertainty (in which we sit at the time of writing) that causes major concern.  
Much depends on whether the UK pursues a 'hard' BREXIT or a 'soft' one. 
 
IV In conclusion 
 
The available evidence suggests that those elements of the financial sector 
most affected by a hard BREXIT will be those to whom passporting rights and 
access to high skill non-UK personnel matters most.  That in turn means those 
who either work directly to sell into EU markets or who relate to other 
organisations which sell into those markets.  Such organisations could be UK 
based, say in the City of London, or foreign companies working to sell into the 
EU via the UK.  
 
It might appear at first glance that Scottish fund managers and asset managers 
may face the most significant impact due to loss of passporting rights.  However, 
many of them already have the legal entities ± µPDQDJHPHQWFRPSDQLHV¶± in 
place in other locations (typically, but not exclusively, in Luxembourg or Dublin) 
that determine the domicile of an investment vehicle for regulatory purposes.  In 
SUDFWLFH WKHQ HYHQ ZLWK WKH µKDUGHVW¶ RI %5(;,7V WKH\ FRXOG RSHUDWH LQ D
broadly similar manner to other non-EU fund providers, relying on the 
international norms that allow the management of investment portfolios to be 
delegated to non-EU countries.  They will, at least, have options, depending on 
their product range and target markets.  This will apply especially if they are 
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offering products that had initially been created within the EU framework for 
such products.  
 
Areas such as retail banking, insurance (as represented in Scotland) and 
pensions appear to be less at risk.  Investment banking is very limited in 
Scotland, although Scottish companies will sell into London-based investment 
banking organisations.  Any impact for them will be indirect not direct. 
 
However, elements of even these sectors least at risk from the loss of 
passporting may yet suffer as a result of any constraint on retaining or recruiting 
high skilled staff from EU or elsewhere.  The top quality, highest value-added, 
components of the financial sector are the ones that bring most added value to 
Scotland.  They are also the ones most at risk from any immigration constraint.  
 
Many parts of the Scottish financial services sector may be dependent upon the 
OLTXLGLW\SURYLGHGYLD/RQGRQ¶VILQDQFLDOPDUNHWVZLWKWKHLUFOHDULQJhouses and 
exchanges.  Any risk to these could flow through to Scottish-based activities. 
 
It should further be noted that, following the impending round of fiscal devolution 
to the Scottish Parliament, slower growth in Scotland due to problems in this 
sector or elsewhere will have a direct effect on the share of UK income tax 
revenue allocated to Scotland.  
We have not attempted to quantify these effects; that would be a very 
substantial task.  However, given the size of the sector and its relatively high 
contribution to incomes and GDP, the loss would be material.  
 
7KHFOHDU LPSOLFDWLRQ LV WKDW LWZRXOGEH LQ6FRWODQG¶V LQWHUHVWVWRFRQWLQXHWR
press the case for the UK Government to negotiate a continuation of 
passporting rights; and further to press for agreement to take a less than rigid 
line so far as retention and recruitment of high skilled staff from overseas is 
concerned.  To do otherwise would appear unduly masochistic.  
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This line of argument does not take us to a case for Scottish independence in 
the EU.  The risks to relationships for the financial sector with counterparts and 
customers of one type or another in the rest of the UK would intuitively appear 
at least as great as the risks from a hard BREXIT while remaining within the 
UK.  The uncertainties for the sector following independence look even greater 
than those following a sharp BREXIT. 
 
However, we do return, in closing, to the final possible mitigations mentioned 
on page one.  Is there some means to achieve the least bad of both worlds?  
Could the Scottish financial sector (along perhaps with some other sectors) be 
JUDQWHG VXIILFLHQW µLQGHSHQGHQFH¶ ± including some flexibility within the UK 
regulatory system ± to allowed it to continue using passporting rights in some 
areas, or some other differential treatment to facilitate access to EU markets, 
even while the rest of the UK chooses to act otherwise?  
 
This would require the strong support of the UK Government, including 
devolving further powers to Scotland and allowing Scotland to negotiate the EU 
aspects of their exercise directly with Brussels and being willing to implement 
changes at the UK level that might undermine the integrity of the existing single 
market for all financial services.  It would also require acceptance by the 
Scottish Parliament of some of the liabilities attached to the business of 
regulating financial services, perhaps around compensation schemes and legal 
risks.  The apportionment of such risks within a UK regulatory framework is 
likely to be difficult.  In addition, it would require brave moves by the EU to 
venture into a new type of arrangement with one part of a European country 
and to accept a fragmented model of regulation not seen elsewhere within the 
EU or envisaged in the EU regulatory frameworks.  
 
Further, if this possibility were to make any sense, it would require all concerned 
± in the EU, UK and Scotland ± to treat this as a long term solution.  That might 
prove a particularly difficult line for the SNP administration.  We are not aware 
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of such a variegated approach to financial regulation anywhere else ± if this is 
a pig that might fly, it is not a version that is currently airborne! 
 
Another area in which Scotland within a post-BREXIT UK could seek some 
special relationship with the EU is in relation to the movement of people.  As 
QRWHGDERYHRQHRI WKH8.DQG6FRWODQG¶VPDLQDWWUDFWLRQV for international 
companies who need to move people around is its openness.  Recent changes 
to immigration rules introduced by the Cameron government have already 
raised questions about increasing paperwork and restrictions on visas.  More 
recent statements by the new May government have only increased these 
concerns. 
 
A different policy for Scotland may not be wholly implausible ± indeed this 
prospect was raised some years ago by Professor Robert Wright of Strathclyde 
University in a seminar and paper for the David Hume Institute.  It was also 
touched upon in the final report of the Smith Commission.  Where 
circumstances and attitudes between the UK and Scottish Parliaments on the 
movement of people differ so widely, then why not create different policies 
between the two?  If Scotland were to seek, as a policy goal, continued success 
for its financial services industry, then some differentiated  approach ± vis-à-vis 
the UK - to the movement of people in and out of Scotland would be a good (if 
difficult) place to start.  
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